Predatory vs. Dialogic Ethics

Constructing an Illusion or Ethical Practice as the Core of Research Methods

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The ethical conduct of research is addressed from two perspectives, as a regulatory enterprise that creates an illusion of ethical practice and as a philosophical concern for equity and the imposition of power within the conceptualization and practice of research itself. The authors discuss various contemporary positions that influence conceptualizations of ethical practices that include imperialist market imperatives for research that marginalize ethical concerns, positions held by peoples who have themselves been traditionally placed in the margins of societal power, academic positions and the selves of individual researchers, and locations created for the specific regulation of research. The final section of the paper introduces the articles in this special issue; these articles illustrate the complexity and cultural embeddedness of research regulation as well as the need for reflexive critical discourses that recognize the moral and ethical dimensions of everything but especially as related to the construction and practice of research.

Keywords: research ethics; regulation; critical morality; philosophy

Issues regarding the ethical conduct of research are emerging from locations that are themselves multivocal and characterized by complexity and diversity. Furthermore, research ethics will never be clearly definable. As Foucault (1985) posited in his discussion of the construction of the ethical self, attempts to create a universalist morality would be “catastrophic” (p. 12). Contemporarily, this calamity is certainly evidenced in the functioning of and reaction to legislation and review boards/committees designed to protect human subjects and participants in research contexts.
Qualitative researchers are already aware of the complexities, contextual and cultural embeddedness, particularities, and challenges involved in the ethical practice of research. However, because of those complexities and contingencies and because of the academic pressures placed on us to gather data (even when we acknowledge data as “our own” constructions), interpret results, and publish, sometimes ethical considerations are trivialized by our “will to be good scholars” as defined by the research community and to do good academic work. Even though, at least theoretically and methodologically, the problems with a naïve acceptance of the notion of innocent scholarship are recognized, we continue to attempt to share the knowledges of Others with the world. We may or may not ask the philosophical and values questions that would ground ethical constructions of research: Whose knowledge is this? Why (as a researcher) do I choose to construct this problem? What assumptions are hidden within my research practices? How could this work produce exclusions? What do I do as I encounter those unexpected exclusions or oppressions that result from the work? What is my privilege (or power position) in this research? How am I subtly reinscribing my own universals and/or discrediting others?

Complicating, but perhaps also bringing to the forefront, our own ethical struggles regarding the conceptualization and practice of research is the imposition of legislated regulations. Within neoliberalism, these regulations are being increasingly acted on as if they were universal “benchmarks” of ethical behavior. This global move toward regulation of research ethics as enterprise (although imposed somewhat differently within various nations) can also result in the belief and the creation of the illusion that moral concerns, power issues, justice, protecting other human beings (and so on) have been addressed with no further need for concern. We are at a point in history in which we can either construct a dialogue that acknowledges the need for the public and scholarly infusion of research ethics as a major component of our conceptualizations and practices or face the possibility that both research and ethics as constructs will be narrowed, controlled, and legitimated through regulatory practices (and the discourses that are constructing them and influencing their interpretations).

The purposes of this special issue of *Qualitative Inquiry* (“Predatory vs. Dialogic Ethics”) are to focus on the notion of research ethics, first as a regulatory enterprise, constructing an illusion of the ethical practice of research (predatory control that would be used as desired to narrow and discredit or commodify and market), and second as philosophical concern for the equitable treatment of others, moral examination of self, and particularized understandings and responses that are infused throughout our research.
practices (engaging in ethical dialogue and negotiation that becomes the core of research practices). The articles in this issue represent the multiplicity of locations and positions from which contributions to the discourses are emerging. These locations are, in part, legal and political, to some extent informed by reflections on critical issues in the field interconnected with the life circumstances of both researcher and participant, partly reflexive and often circumscribed by actual interactions with regulatory review boards/committees and their apparent intrusion on research practices, particular methodologies, and certain classes of scholars and inquirers.

**Positioning the Voices of Research Ethics**

The notion of “researcher/researched,” even when acknowledging researcher as instrument and research participant as partner, does not address the multivocal and contradictory positions that contemporarily influence research ethics as regulatory enterprise versus grounded philosophical disposition and way of being. Yet, for researchers, attention to this range of voices and positionings is absolutely necessary, not only for the protection of those who have been/are the “objects” of research (or those affected in other ways by that research) but to insure the survival of a diversity of knowledges and the academic freedom and support that would insure diverse research paradigms and approaches. Attention must be given to (a) new forms of imperialism as exhibited in contemporary global hypercapitalism that construct research and ethics as related to market philosophies; (b) the multiple life positions, locations, and voices of those who have been research participants and created as the Other historically, whether indigenous people, poor women, prisoners, children, or anyone who has been “represented” through some form of research; (c) academia itself and the ethical research perspectives and practices of those who conduct research and train others in those practices; and (d) the contemporary legislative, policy, and enforcement environment that would impose particular behaviors a priori on individual researchers. The positions that we discuss are not all inclusive but rather illustrate the multiplicity of locations from which voices, agendas, and perspectives must be considered. In qualitative research in particular, we are seeing what one researcher called the “proliferation of paradigms;” as a consequence, the standpoints and locations of researchers have multiplied in such a way as to lend a thickness and density to what once appeared to be a rather unitary set of practices and understandings around qualitative inquiry. There is no single qualitative inquiry today but rather a growing set of
practices deployed in the service of multiple understandings of social life—a circumstance that, more than ever before, calls for attention to the range of positions and voices that influence conceptualizations of ethical practices.

**Research Ethics and New Capitalist Imperialist Positions**

In today’s global environment, dominant discourses (re)inscribe all human activity as economic (e.g., even religion is tied to some forms of profiteering). The use and acceptance of knowledge is legitimated only as applicable to market perspectives. Through this new global capitalist imperialism, the marketing of goods produced from physical resources plays a less obvious role than does the commodification of knowledge (Lincoln, 1998) and human cultural experience (Rifkin, 2000). Diverse intellectual and cultural knowledges are being patented, reproduced, and sold (whether as new medical information, yoga exercises, cultural education practices, forms of communication, or knowledge of plants and plant biology, to name a few). Market domination over diverse epistemologies, in the name of new knowledge discovery and the entrepreneurial profit imperative, is used to legitimate authority over intellectual and cultural property. Eurocentric and American definitions of science and free trade are employed to perform “intellectual piracy” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 232; Shiva, 2000), certainly an ethical issue for those who would conduct research into the lives, experiences, and knowledges of others.

A form of capitalist imperialism, beyond religion or simple capitalism, is conquering the world through invasions in which all human activity is interpreted though the notion of free markets (although those markets are never actually free and are certainly not equitable). Large corporations have crossed national boundaries, challenged state authority, and been granted access to rights that are most often associated with individual human beings in democratic societies (Cannella & Viruru, 2004; Chomsky, 1999; Horwitz, 1992). Furthermore, “transnational” corporations claim to have interests that go beyond national interests (Korten, 2001). These corporations have attained greater rights within the law than individuals and are in the position to ignore, transform, or construct and/or reconstruct national regulations to suit their own, often predatory and oppressive, marketing practices. Attempts by state governments or even their abilities to construct (or impose) research ethics in such an environment certainly requires critique and examination but is also an absolute necessity.
For example, by reading up the power hierarchy from peasant women in India to the World Trade Organization, Shiva (2000) has demonstrated the ways that the epistemologies of poor women (e.g., information about plants, seeds, and medicine) are used to make globalization possible through the cooptation/stealing of knowledge (biopiracy). The Indian government has attempted to stop the piracy of thousands of years of cultural understandings, knowledges that are actually considered a collective “intellectual commons” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 233) by creating a public virtual library. This digital library of 30 million pages is being constructed that will contain Indian indigenous knowledge as a protection against patenting and profiteering (Das, 2006).

Additionally, global hypercapitalism is infused with a form of patriarchy that would control the conceptualization of research and, therefore, position itself to discredit research when its practices challenge privatization, profiteering, or corporatization. This “(re)privileging” of particular forms of research and contemporary attempts to discredit certain methodologies and research epistemologies are obvious in discourses of accountability, quality, evidenced-based practice, and commissioned reports such as that of the National Research Council (2002). Investment is created as a synonym for research in an environment in which resources are being redeployed to locations that are market driven while also representing a narrowed form of fundamentalist patriarchy. To be considered ethical practice under this capitalist-corporatist regime, research would be required to yield returns on investment. This economically driven research ethics that would “police an unruly world” (Roy, 2004, p. 195) and purchase and sell that world thus creates multiple avenues for imperialism.

Many of us would disagree with the forms of research ethics that would be imposed by this new capitalist imperialism. This ethics of regulation would control through a series of discourses using conceptual sound bites such as accountability, evidence based, and protection and the use of a range of other discourses that would discredit human intellectual diversity (Baez & Boyles, 2006) while at the same time privileging ownership and “free” market profiteering for a chosen few. Yet without the continued recognition of what is being said and the methods used to construct legitimation for those voices, challenges and counterethics are most likely impossible.

**Positions Held by Research Subjects and Representation from the Margin(s)**

Living within postmodern challenges to dominant grand narratives, scholars from historically colonized, aboriginal, and indigenous communities
have made clear the (un)ethical practice of research that has inscribed White male as authority and the researched Other (whether labeled native, person of color, woman, or child) as passive, reified, less intelligent being (hooks, 1990; Smith, 1999). Their challenges have resulted in new forms of postcolonial critique that reveal (a) Eurocentric error in research constructs, methodologies, and interpretations (Jaimes, 1992); (b) the creation of research fictions about the Other (Said, 1994; Subba & Som, 2005); (c) the ways that language use in research privileges particular groups (Loomba, 1998); and (d) general biases that would impose particular ethical perspectives in assuming the right, and will, to “know” others (Dirks, 2001).

The fundamental tenet of research, the general belief in the human need (and right) to “know” and also that this “knowing” is both possible and ethically appropriate, is problematized in Dirks’s (2001) discussion of the British drive to find out more about the “native” in India. A “colonial intransitivity” (p. 44) led the British to believe that knowledge about the “native” would lesson the likelihood that those same natives could know the British in return. Furthermore, to avoid the possibility that an abundance of facts would be unmanageable and even challenge constructions of the Other, research and the illusion that one could know the details of that Other fostered the representation of natives as different, mysterious, and deceptive (potentially lying or at least withholding the truth). During occupation, India was even created in British eyes as the ethnographic state (Dirks, 2001). Certainly, the past and present use of Western science to colonize, represent, and recolonize are ethical issues tied to research as practice overall.

Furthermore, postcolonial scholars remind us that research constructs such as “voice” and the use of language represent the unquestioned fundamental Western beliefs that Western minds can understand and possess the inherent right to interpret the world. The language labels West and East were even created by Westerners, in part to distinguish “us” from “them,” or in other words to manufacture an/the Other. For example, hearing the voices of Others simply becomes another “colonizing apparatus” (Cannella & Viruru, 2004, p. 147), as the Western ear is constructed as having the power to listen and the intellect that would create harmonious pluralism (Mohanty, 1991). This colonizing apparatus thus denies the ways that distinctions are manufactured through the imposition of disequity, defines those who have been “silenced” as intellectually lacking and/or possessing inarticulate voices, and ultimately reinforces the language of those in power (Cannella & Viruru, 2004; Mohanty, 2001).

Postcolonial critics demonstrate that ultimately local discourses, knowledges, and ways of being cannot be translated into imperialist research
language (Gandhi, 1998; Spivak, 1988). Furthermore, Western research locations (the most common being universities) are understood as constructing nondominant scholars as objectified, exotic intellectuals and nondominant knowledge (and peoples) as unified, colorful, and even mystifying. The extraordinary challenges are to refuse simplification, embrace contradiction, and recognize that translation and research practices can result in speaking against oneself as a nondominant researcher (Seth, 1981), unconsciously reinscribing new power positions to self as Euro-American researcher, and/or recreating the intellectual other or the research participant other. At best, research results are always warped versions of the shifting and complex original, originals that are never static and may themselves abhor the Eurocentric error that would “know” and “understand.”

**Positioning Academia and Researcher Constructions of Ethical Practice**

Scholars who have at times also been relegated to the margins in academia, including constructivists, feminists, critical poststructuralists, and those associated with various postmodernist orientations, have struggled with ethics as embedded within the conceptualization and practice of research. The work of many of these academics has challenged truth orientations as well as the implicit role of researchers in the construction of power through activities such as surveillance or deterministic triangulations. As an example, Walkerdine (1997) cautions against the “voyeuristic thrill of the ‘oh, are they really like that’ feeling” (p. 67). Invoking critical dispositions, intrinsically ethical questions, such as the following, are being asked about research practices: How are forms of exclusion being produced? Is transformative and liberatory research possible that also examines its own will to emancipate? How can we deconstruct the power orientations intrinsic in our choice of research problems? How does the practice of research reinscribe our own privilege? “How do we work with people who are not academically trained to insure that any research we conduct on their behalf is in collaboration with them?” (Cannella & Viruru, 2004, p. 152; see also Demas, 2003).

Furthermore, researchers in the qualitative and critical traditions remind us that particular research methods assume continuous reflexive ethics throughout the process (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). These principled struggles are integral to the methodological practices of such researchers, as illustrated in recent discussions such as those surrounding the distancing effects of globalization on representation (Fine, Weis, Weseen, & Wong, 2000; Tedlock, 2005). Even when we choose research based on an ethical
concern for other human beings, the complexities of human circumstances, power networks, and interactions in/with the world result in the need for ethical practices that are cognizant of conflicting and shifting global and local issues. Furthermore, a critical lens must be continuously used to reveal unexamined (albeit unconscious) bias and agendas. As an example, although most would no longer argue with the need for profound environmentalism, some discourses of sustainability (and the research practices and interpretations associated with them) further discredit, blame, and increase the difficulty of life conditions for those who have historically been placed in the margins, such as those in poverty. The “benevolent (white) hand of the West” is presented as saving the environment, and the world (Escobar, 1995, p. 193), even as it recreates new forms of oppression from within that salvation discourse.

Although scholars are, to varying degrees, literally reconceptualizing thinking regarding the purposes and practices of research, learning to form partnerships necessary to revision the purposes and practices of research, and attempting communitarian/collectivist challenges to notions of the individual, research as construct remains a modernist, individualistic, male-oriented endeavor. This condition will continue to exist, at least until we reconceptualize in practice a range of interconnected, oppressive societal institutions (Collins, 2000), specifically academia, conservative media practices, regulatory legislation, and the imperative for individualistic profiteering. Therefore, we must also continue to search within the “master’s house” (Lorde, 1984) for tools that would turn “up-side-down” our dominant conceptualizations of research, as we rethink and reconstruct ethical systems.

One such example is Foucault’s proposition that we each struggle (as researchers and otherwise) to counter the fascist power orientations within ourselves. Agreeing with Deleuze and Guattari (1983) that we as human beings tend toward a kind of fascism that yields to the love of power over, and domination/exploitation of, others, Foucault (1985) proposed an individualistic ethical framework that would require that we struggle to counter the inclination toward oppressive power within ourselves. Ethics is not interpreted as inscribing universalist moral codes or prohibitions, but “an intensification of the relation to oneself by which one constitutes oneself as the subject of one’s acts” (Foucault, 1986, p. 41). An ethical construction of self would be placed at the forefront, embedded within the recognition that the construction of universalist morality would be “catastrophic” (Foucault, 1985, p. 12). Using the “master’s tools” that would focus on the individual being (or researcher) as agent, an ethics that examined one’s relation to self would acknowledge the way in which the researcher is uniquely rooted in
a particular history, context, and veiled privilege. The purpose of this critical lens would be the avoidance of self-absorption that results in fascist (although often subconscious) power orientations that are intrinsic within the conceptualization of research as practice (Bernauer & Mahon, 1996). We would also remind the reader that educators further risk this power orientation (an educational elitism) by constructing connections between research, the creation of expert knowledge as legitimizing force, and the privileging of self-identified “advanced” forms of intellectual functioning.

Even movements for emancipation have produced normalization and, consequently, resulted in the narrowing of human possibilities and the creation of new forms of power (whether prison reform, overcoming sexual oppression and repression, attention to the mentally ill, or in the identification and saving of those who are “not” educated; see Baez & Boyles, 2006). These research practices have constituted the subject in ways that limit and normalize—even when the participant would be “saved”—even when the participant is sharing his or her experiences, constructions, or voice. Continual engagement with notions of ethics and ethical relations in inquiry are necessary to reveal the limitations, contingencies, even elitisms, and other inadequacies of modern morality in all its forms, whether regulatory, salvation oriented, or postmodernist.

An elaboration of even an individualistic ethical framework would acknowledge forms of governmentality that tend toward conceptualizing (and masking) power as unitary as well as recognizing the strategic governance of self as articulated through relations to, and with, others (Foucault, 1986). Researchers would ask themselves questions such as “How should I/we govern myself/ourselves?” (Foucault, 1989, framing cited in Davidson, 1996, p. 119). What aspect of my/our daily practice as researcher(s) “is relevant for ethical attention and judgment” (Foucault, 1985, p. 28)? How does one think differently, to transform self so one considers “the perspective of the cosmic Whole” related to research purposes, interpretations, and ethical forms of dissemination (Davidson, 1996, p. 121; González y González & Lincoln, 2005)?

A genealogy of the self is possible along three axes: the truth axis, or the ontology of self in relation to/subject of knowledge; the power axis, through which one constitutes self as acting on others; and the ethical axis or self as moral agent. This third axis is particularly important as one constructs self as ethical researcher. Especially relevant for this elaboration of the ethical researcher are the aspects of the ethical axis through which the self acts on itself. These aspects are (a) the ethical substance, the way one constitutes the researcher self morally; (b) the mode of subjectification, the
way the individual establishes self in relation to contemporary rule; (c) ethical work, the methods used to transform oneself and one’s research behaviors as an ethical being; and (d) telos, the disassembly of oneself in ways that demonstrate commitment to an ethical practice of research that refuses power over others (Foucault, 1985; Rabinow, 1994).

**Ethical substance.** The embodied moral self is not considered a given but a substance constituted as a relational activity. However, the self is considered the emergent creative agent, the composer of self as a work of art. The part, and constitutive method, of oneself that is the “will to truth” is the ethical substance. This constituted moral substance is defined as “that which enables one to get free from oneself” (Foucault, 1985, p. 9) and is not the same for everyone. As examples, acts that unified pleasure and desire constituted ethical substance for the Greeks; some believe that for modern societies, feelings are the material of ethics (although this has varied for Christians at different points historically); intention (as embedded in reason) is the ethical substance of Kantian philosophy; and for some, conceptualizations of social justice are the ethical substances of the self. Furthermore, ethical substance is that which addresses the tendency for self-deception (whether facilitating or disallowing the inclination). For researchers, several questions can be generated:

How and under what circumstances do I constitute thinking as a moral domain (paraphrased from Foucault, 1985, p. x) and thinking about research as a moral activity?
Does the conceptualization and practice of research contribute to the constitution of a particular individual ethical substance (e.g., Western medical breakthrough, saving indigenous people)?
What part of me is concerned with moral/ethical conduct, and how is that played out in my behavior as a researcher?

**Mode of subjectification.** Foucault appears to accept a notion that the self is/will be subjectified by particular rules and resultant obligations. Whatever the rule, the self becomes (through its own constitution) the subject, in a sense the Other that is constructed by the rule. The accepted and constituted rules will vary and have at various times been defined as divine law, natural law, cosmological order, rational rule, even beauty (to name a few). The individual establishes relationships to his or her rule(s) through the construction of obligations to self and others. For example, Kant focused on the obligation to “know,” to the proper relationship with enlightened intention—to use reason as a method of self-governance, a mode of subjectification.
Foucault’s method of constructing self as Other and resultant obligations involved the construction and imposition of a critical, historical disposition. Examinations of the mode(s) of subjectification for researchers could include such questions as the following:

What rules are subsumed within ethical substance (e.g., for individual selves as researchers; within particular conceptualizations of research)?
How are these rules acted on in research activities to conceptualize/legitimate and implement moral obligations (e.g., for individual selves as researchers, in research training experiences)?
As an example from a critical perspective, are there individuals/groups that are privileged/harmed as particular ethical modes of subjectification are implemented in the conduct of research?

**Ethical work.** The means chosen and performed by the self that would achieve ethical transformation is described by Foucault (1986) as ethical work, self-forming activity. Different systems of action are believed to be informed by thought, yet because thought is not a given, it is also considered action—a form of practical work. For Foucault, this ethical work must involve a self-criticism that requires historical examination into the constitution of the self; the analysis must involve “the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think” (p. 27). Thought is always considered a practice of freedom that could take a different shape or form. The ethical work is to define conditions under which one questions self and actions as well as how to invent new ways of being and forming relationships. Examples of ethical work questions for researchers would be as follows:

What are the means by which we can change ourselves to become ethical subjects (of our research)? . . . What are we to do, either to moderate our acts, or to decipher what we are, or to eradicate our desires, . . . to behave ethically (Foucault, 1994, p. 265)?
How would the ethical paths not taken in my research be envisioned?
What new modes of ethical relations do I invent within the practices of research?
What improbable ethical inventions do I make possible?

**Telos.** The final aspect of the ethical self is telos, an active, steady modification of one’s own thought/actions toward a committed pattern of ethical being, a form of self-bricolage that slowly and arduously reshapes. This continual elaboration of the self establishes a condition that questions, functions to think differently (rather than legitimating the known), and
swerves to avoid historic obstacles (Foucault, 1986; Rabinow, 1994). Telos implies ethical practice that is committed and patterned but is flexible, transformative, and emergent. Questions for researchers could include the following:

What is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way? For instance, shall we become pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on (Foucault, 1994, p. 265)? How do I assemble myself as an ethical researcher?

How is this ethical being reflected in the conceptualizations of research that I choose?

What are the ethical contents and patterns of conduct (e.g., thought questions, concerns, inclusion of others, forms of contextual recognition, daily practices) of my researcher self?

These aspects of ethical being as related to the conceptualization and practice of research are certainly modernist, male oriented, and privilege reason, even as they are recognized as historically, politically, and contextually grounded. However, they also demonstrate that the “master’s tools” would include analysis, reflection (even reflexivity), critique, and transformation. Even dominant discourses, if fully examined and understood from within the historical context from which they have emerged (including the counternotions that they have generated, such as social justice, equity, complexity, poststructuralism), offer depth and possibility for ethical practice. This depth of ethical being cannot, however, be found in control-oriented, legislated constructions of research ethics that would define moral behavior through regulation.

**Positioning the Ethical Practice of Research as That Which Is Regulated**

Around the world, various research review processes have been legislated in an effort to protect human subjects in the biomedical and social sciences. As researchers are aware, these efforts originated as a reaction to medical research atrocities. Yet even in medical sciences, much less the social sciences, regulating the ethical practice of research is problematic. Controlling the experimental activities of participants is difficult even when expected behaviors are agreed on a priori and oversight is often sketchy (Weinstein, 2004). At times, the regulations, the regulators, and the process itself actually contribute to ways of functioning that most would consider unethical. Some researchers follow the review guidelines,
recognizing that regulations are not actually ethics; others submit research for review because of funding requirements yet use data (although approved by review) in ways that some would identify as unethical. Universalist review (conducted by regulatory boards-committees, whatever their title might be) creates the illusion that ethical concerns have been addressed and that no further concern is necessary. However, rather than addressing ethical concerns and genuine protection for research participants (which may be the purposes of individual committee member scholars), the practice of regulation is widely recognized as institutional concern for the protection of the sponsoring research agency against reduction of funding, elimination of research prestige, and lawsuits (Lincoln & Tierney, 2004). Furthermore, in some institutions, pressure is even being applied for administrators to certify (before institutional review and approval) that “studies are not ‘silly’” (Hemmings, 2006, p. 16). Certainly, these are dangerous regulatory times.

Qualitative researchers are attempting to inform, shift, and shape the discourse by joining review boards, becoming involved with national regulatory agencies, and trying to educate colleagues more familiar with positivist/postpositivist views of research (Cannella, 2004; Lincoln & Tierney, 2004). This education involves demonstrations of the ways that particular forms of qualitative research infuse ethical considerations for participants and emerging circumstances throughout by using models of reflexivity (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004) that call for ongoing identification and examination of ethical issues as they arise in research activities rather than proceeding as though all ethical concerns had been addressed in the review process. These models of reflexivity involve prolonged attention to the ethical treatment and protection of individuals involved with, or affected by, the research throughout the process. By mandating ongoing attention to ethical concerns, ethical reflexivity reminds researchers that few research projects proceed as expected; many ethical issues are unforeseen in advance; participants have their own concerns regarding ethical behavior which cannot be predicted by institutional review boards; ethics, as a general concern, reside in specific situations with the complex histories of individuals; and complexity theory is a better descriptor of human life than regularity and generalization.

Furthermore, organizations such as the International Congress on Qualitative Inquiry and the American Anthropological Association are currently working on position statements related to regulatory practices in various countries and national contexts. Professional groups such as the American Historical Association, the American Educational Research Association, the American Sociological Association (ASA), and the American Anthropological
Association have created their own ethical guidelines for the conduct of research that attempt to recognize both the diversity of research perspectives and methodologies and concern for the subjects of research (Lincoln & Denzin, 2005). For example, in addition to a continued focus on the rights of indigenous peoples, recently social anthropologists have established an initiative that is concerned with “contributions to public debates about ethical principles and practice in the world” (ASA, 2006).

Yet the inclusion of increasingly more and diverse voices does not/will not result in a universal understanding of research ethics or methods of legislating protection. The articles in this special issue illustrate why the regulation of research ethics will continue to be problematic as well as elusive, demonstrating a need for research into practices of research regulation as well as providing insight into the ways that regulation is culturally grounded and may even create conditions in which research subjects/participants are less protected than without regulations.

**Special Issue: Predatory vs. Dialogic Ethics**

The articles in this special issue of *Qualitative Inquiry*, “Predatory vs. Dialogic Ethics,” focus on the complexity of research ethics. The first set illustrates the complicatedness of research ethics as regulatory enterprise, constructing illusions of the ethical practice of research that actually make possible predatory control that is used circumstantially to narrow and discredit or commodify and market. Furthermore, research regulation is recognized as reinscribing particular cultural biases. The second set of articles focuses on reconceptualizations of research ethics as particularized understandings and responses that are infused throughout research processes, as a principled, moral dialogue with self and others that becomes the core of research conceptualizations and practices.

**Examining Predatory Ethics: Moral Illusions and Control Agendas**

Although the first articles in this particular issue focus specifically on the regulatory enterprise, we would hope that reader-researchers remain cognizant of the multiple positionings that must be considered, even related to regulation. Furthermore, although qualitative inquiry has tended to emphasize social science research, the recognition of diverse knowledges challenges the boundaries constructed between physical and social science by introducing notions such as cultural or individual intellectual property,
community knowledges, or false (or unserviceable) dualisms between the mental and the physical.

In “Rethinking Ethics Review as Institutional Discourse,” Christine Halse and Anne Honey trace the history of research ethics from the margin of academic philosophical life to its emergence in public institutional discourse established through laws, codes, and particularized methods of implementation. This regulatory condition is examined as constructing incoherent ethical theories that result in systems of governmentality and privilege “a new professional class of certified ethicists,” a group of technicians who regulate (even if they are volunteers who would prefer not to regulate). As ethical practice in the real world takes a back seat to ethical technology, the production of colonizing effects actually make “respect for persons” virtually impossible. Furthermore, the authors also stress that although identities are considered necessarily fluid in the situated, corporeal circumstance of the practice of research in the real world, the governance of research ethics reinforces inflexible binaries that construct “subjects” as innocent and defenseless and “researchers” as immoral and dangerous. The (re)inventing of discourses of research ethics is considered necessary in ways that avoid reinforcing (through regulation) the unethical practices that the regulations are designed to prevent.

In “Handing IRB an Unloaded Gun,” Carol Rambo details her specific experiences with an Institutional Review Board at the University of Memphis as she attempted to publish an autoethnographic manuscript dealing with the boundaries that surround identity, incest, and teacher-student relationships. She uses her own personal experience and the reactions of others to frame a narrative that challenges the normalized spaces of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the author’s work generates a range of questions for the reader that include problematizing the boundaries and appropriateness of research regulation, examining the agendas (conscious or otherwise) of those who would regulate, but more important, querying our need as qualitative researchers to recognize the professional as the personal while at the same time examining how this personalizing of our work affects those around us.

Marco Marzano demonstrates how cultural perspectives are played out as the “ethical” practices of research are constructed in different settings in “Informed Consent, Deception and Research Freedom in Qualitative Research: A Cross-Cultural Comparison.” He describes his experiences conducting research with the terminally ill in Italy, a cultural location in which the physician is considered the person who controls the information regarding diagnosis and prognosis and the patient is not considered emotionally stable (as a result of the mental strain that would be imposed through the knowledge of a terminal illness). In this circumstance, supplying social
research information to the subject is not required and may even be con-
sidered detrimental. Marzano compares this perspective to the Anglo-Saxon
experience in which ethical practices are assumed to be dealt with because
reviews and informed consent are practiced. The author concludes that “the
wider cultural context decisively influences the researcher’s methodological
and ethical options” (p. 426). This influence is demonstrably related to beliefs
about the subject that privilege rationality, the ways cultural context limits
research design and emergence, and the ultimate ethical burden that always
rests on the shoulders of the researcher.

In Canadian “University Ethics Review: Cultural Complications Translating
Principles Into Practice,” Susan Tilley and Louise Gormley explore the
inherent contradictions in attending to regulations promulgated nationally—
and applied locally in the university research context for dissertation
research—and their perceived utility in a rural Mexican context. In the
actual research context, attention to anonymity and confidentiality become
challenges to research participants’ perceptions of what is ethical, to the
meaning of one’s words and how those words represent individual integrity,
and indeed to the whole question of individual and community identity.
“Translations,” whether linguistic or of cultural research codes, perforce do
not move on a one-to-one basis, and what is considered sound practice in
the Canadian (or U.S.) context may be considered inappropriate or com-
pletely unethical in other research sites. Tilley and Gormley focus specifi-
cally on four issues foundational to Canadian and U.S. regulatory policies
around research: consent, and the extent to which it is informed, ill
informed (that is, whether researchers recognize the limitations of consent
and consent’s implications in a given environment [in this case, a women’s
prison]), or uninformed; the intertwined issues of anonymity and confiden-
tiality, especially when they are important and when they might be consid-
ered to violate local ethical cultural patterns; reciprocity, or the extent to
which local participants have access to the knowledges we bring to our own
professional arenas; and the representation-re/presentation of our data,
including the images we limn for readers, and the extent to which those
images possess fidelity but might bring harm to our research participants
(a point raised several years ago by Fine et al., 2000).

**Engaging in Dialogic Ethics: Constructing a Reflexive Research Center**

The final set of articles illustrates the more dialogic nature of conceptual-
izations of ethics and ethical practice in qualitative research. These articles
place at the forefront notions of ethical research work that would be con-
sidered whether regulation were a consideration.

In “The Tensions Between Academic Freedom and Institutional Review
Boards,” by William Tierney and Zoë Blumberg Corwin, the issue of acad-
emic freedom is raised, largely because Tierney and Corwin see academic
freedom and the regulatory functions of institutional review boards as
potentially existing on a collision course. The expansion of institutional
review board jurisdiction (regulating coursework offered in graduate
programs in accredited universities would be one example; mandating
changes in research design, or even suggesting researchers pursue different
or alternative research questions, would be another) has begun to restrict in
subtle ways the foundational principle of academic freedom, the “unfet-
tered search for truth” in which professors are admonished to engage.

Three ways in which institutional review boards “potentially infringe on
academic freedom” (p. 388) are discussed here. Although Tierney and Corwin
suggest that institutional review boards may “potentially infringe” on aca-
demic freedom, we would suggest that the potential has been realized, even
if in isolated cases. The regulation of who is required to consent to research
has long been a problem with indigenous populations, where knowledge is
considered a community asset (Lincoln, 2004) and among other popula-
tions who rely heavily on “my word” or a handshake to indicate under-
standing, agreement, and a representation of integrity. When institutional
review boards stipulate the kinds of research questions permitted and
approved sites and locales where research interaction can occur, they are
again infringing on academic freedom, as they especially limit qualitative
researchers’ mandate to observe, interview, and interact with research par-
ticipants in their natural contexts, where they pursue the activities of
research interest. And finally, Tierney and Corwin suggest that institutional
review boards may engage in wittingly or unwittingly limiting research
designs, especially the designs of interpretive researchers but also of others.
These are not possibilities; from anecdotal evidence collected by both the
editors and the authors of this piece, such infringements have already
occurred and are likely to occur with increasing frequency as the discourses
around regulatory ethics become more strident and as individual institu-
tional review boards in academic institutions expand the purview of their
supervision and expand and exceed their legitimate mandates.

M. Carolyn Clark and Barbara Sharf, in “The Dark Side of Truth(s):
Ethical Dilemmas in Researching the Personal,” explore the problems asso-
ciated with the concept of truth-oriented or universalist constructions of
ethics, as if predetermined and regulatable. Four examples of ethical
predicaments are presented that problematize the researcher’s ability to preplan for all ethical dilemmas: a researcher’s promise to share the analysis of a patient’s medical record that reveals the patients uncomplimentary views of the physician, the accidental and unintended discussion of a painful event that had not previously been disclosed by a participant in a vulnerable position, the regulation of online research, and a research participant who could be endangered because of political positions that were disclosed in an interview. The dilemmas demonstrate situations that cannot be preplanned and certainly not be preregulated. Clark and Sharf advocate for the recognitions of the complexity and contextuality of research ethics and the generation of venues through which qualitative researchers can discuss and “learn from one another’s experience and together develop a more reflexive practice” (p. 399).

Clifford Christians, in “Cultural Community as an Ethical Imperative,” undertakes a very different kind of intellectual critique vis-à-vis research ethics. Constructing an argument for a research ethics that proceeds from “cultural continuity,” Christians posits that research ethics proceeding from either regulatory (administrative or official) concerns or from researcher notions of virtuous conduct do not address the “moral dimension of everyday life” (p. 443), nor do they necessarily contribute to human flourishing, one of the foundational principles of moral agency and moral life. Research cannot be understood as objective or neutral but rather as either contributing to or harming the possibility of cultural transformation and moral discernment.

Clearly, Christians has shifted the discourse from how practitioners (especially qualitative practitioners) construct the discourse around research ethics (i.e., making ethics a matter of professional agreement and individual principles) to searching the larger cultural landscape for evidence that research activities are contributing to human flourishing, to an enlarged moral discernment and sense of moral agency, and to positive “recognition” and cultural transformation through critical consciousness. The argument that we should transform the discourse by engaging a vastly different moral discourse regarding the principles behind research ethics is not a new one, but it provides a renewed challenge to the predatory ethical policies being shaped by a neoconservative and neoliberal globalized discourse.

Note

1. We would not agree that there is a “proliferation of paradigms,” as we tend to define paradigm as a complete worldview, or metaphysics, including ontology, epistemology, axiology, aesthetics, and teleology. The diversity, however, of theoretical positions, of identity positions
(e.g., feminist theory, race and/or ethnic theories, queer theories, border and hybrid theories),
and of inquiry perspectives and lenses (e.g., poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonial-
ism) make for rich choices among those practitioners of interpretive and critical interpretive
qualitative research.

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