AN INTELLECTUAL RENAISSANCE
OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY?

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Summary

A review is presented of the historical background of humanistic psychology, which flourished as a distinct movement roughly between the early 1940s to the late 1960s when it fractionated into...
transpersonal interests in meditation and altered states of consciousness, experiential therapeutics such as body work and the group encounter, and an ultraradicalized form of political psychology, and then became absorbed into the psychotherapeutic counter-culture. Having entered a period of relative eclipse since then, its status today after 50 years is assessed. The case is made that humanistic psychologists could potentially launch a renaissance of the movement if they were to dissociate themselves from their present near-pathological focus on the transpersonal, the experiential, and the political long enough to reclaim their rightful place in the history of American academic psychology and then go on to capture the attention of the discipline of psychology with an entirely new metaphysics of how first-rate science should be conducted.

“"The revival of humanistic psychology means that scientific attention is once again being directed toward the primacy of the subjective."”

—James Bugental, 1967

Humanistic psychologists are fond of recounting the 1960s as the time when a major revolution took place. At that point, the humanistic perspective emerged as a so-called Third Force in academic psychology, and by the end of the decade, it had become the guiding light behind the human potential movement in the wider culture at large. Those were certainly heady days for anyone who went through them and got to know the likes of Rollo May, Abraham Maslow, James Bugental, Sidney Jourard, Carl Rogers, Anthony Sutich, Charlotte Buhler, and others. The institutional history of the movement remains well known. The Journal of Humanistic Psychology (JHP) was launched by Sutich and Maslow in 1961. Later that year, the influential pioneers around the journal then launched the American Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP). These events were followed by the historic conference held at Old Saybrook, Connecticut in late November of 1964 in which humanistic psychology was officially enshrined as an intellectual movement within academic psychology. Some of the biggest names in personality-social psychology were there, including Gardner Murphy, Henry A. Murray, and Gordon Allport, and they met with their old friends, the new voices in humanistic psychology—such as Maslow, Rogers, and May. By the end of the decade, graduate programs in humanistic psychology at Sonoma State and then West Georgia College had gotten underway. From these efforts, again around the pioneers who founded JHP—under the
sponsorship of the AHP and in cooperation with Sonoma State College Extension program—the Humanistic Psychology Institute was founded in 1970, which eventually became the first free-standing Ph.D. program in the new psychology. Then, in 1973, Division 32—the Division of Humanistic Psychology—was founded within the American Psychological Association (APA), which has since launched its own journal, The Humanistic Psychologist. Fields as diverse as psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, dentistry, nursing, medicine, citizen-diplomacy, and organizational behavior were enriched as a result. A new road was opened, a farther horizon became visible, and spirits soared as it appeared that, at last, an entirely new era was dawning that focused in psychology but had wider implications involving a new dialogue between science and the humanities.

But, in reporting on an interview with Rollo May, the great pioneer in existential-humanistic psychotherapy before he died, Tom Greening and Jackie Doyle recounted May’s lamentation that too little of what was significant in humanistic psychology from those original halcyon days is visible today (Greening, 1994). Echoing this sentiment, Stanley Krippner—a distinguished faculty member at Saybrook Graduate School and a key contributor to the movement from its very beginnings—has often quipped, “We labored for ten years and gave birth to a mouse.”

Well, what happened? One historical answer is that humanistic psychology ceased being a viable discussion within academic psychology because it became engulfed in the human potential movement around 1969. After that time, it became fragmented. Leaving academia and entering the arena of American folk psychology, it became overtly experiential when it identified with Gestalt therapy, encounter group techniques, and the various body-work regimes. In this vein, it became distinctly anti-intellectual. At the same time, the humanistic movement became more overtly transpersonal when it associated itself too closely with the experiential practice of meditation and altered states of consciousness. This trend led to the replacement of traditional theories of personality and methods of psychotherapy with more esoteric ones blending Eastern religion and philosophy with what came to be called transpersonal psychology. Humanistic psychology also became more overtly involved in political issues in the search for a psychology that was socially relevant. Soon it would be overshadowed by Marxists, social critics, deconstructionists, constructionists,
contextualists, and gender scholars who saw weaknesses within the fledgling institutions of the humanistic movement that would provide a potential platform from which to launch their own ideological agenda.

Meanwhile, within the university environment, there was a cognitive rather than humanistic revolution in academic psychology. Computer modeling of brain states, parallel information processing, artificial intelligence, and interdisciplinary work in the neurosciences that touched many areas of psychology soon took over the field. As the era of behaviorism and Freudian psychoanalysis passed, the new era of cognitive-behaviorism emerged. Although the intellectual breadth of academic psychology still remains quite conceptually narrow—a measure of how restrictive the former era had really been—nevertheless, traditional humanistic themes were soon preempted, and they became incorporated into a somewhat more liberal scientific atmosphere but without being overtly identified as having originated in humanistic psychology at all.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

Today, the standing institutions of the humanistic movement in psychology have a curious relation to one another. The AHP, largely devoted to issues of counterculture psychotherapy and group experiences, sold the JHP to Sage Publications after suffering a decline in membership and lowered revenues. Meanwhile, the Humanistic Psychology Institute, which spun off as an independent entity, was renamed Saybrook Institute in 1982, as much to strengthen its ties to academic psychology and to honor its intellectual roots in the Old Saybrook conference of 1964 as to distance itself from the experiential and anti-intellectual focus of the counterculture psychotherapies. As well, Saybrook has also joined forces with other institutes and departments of psychology in a network called the Consortium for Diversified Psychology Programs (CDPP). Under Saybrook’s wing, The Rollo May Center for Humanistic Studies was launched in the late 1980s. At the same time, an act of the California Legislature created the Archives of Humanistic Psychology at the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Despite these developments, the original founding organizations—JHP, Saybrook, and AHP—continue to exist in a state of
friendly but autonomous detente with regard to their respective policies of operation, vision, and finances. Similar to this, Division 32 within the APA, the Division of Humanistic Psychology, whose founding was actually opposed by the officers of AHP, has always maintained its own center of gravity. It continues as one of the smaller divisions in the APA and has a revolving rather than growing membership, having only a moderate influence on the affairs of the larger association of which it is a part.

Partly the result of so many separate agendas, there has been much hand-wringing over everything having to do with the label “humanistic,” including proposals to even abandon the name. Its body has been declared headless without a new generation of visionary leaders; its head has been declared heartless because it has conformed so much to the mainstream that it no longer acts on its prerogative for incisive dissent, and its heart has been declared brainless for being still too anti-intellectual. Meanwhile, others have declared that the whole humanistic organism has been dead for decades because its votaries have never moved out of the 1960s.

THE SIGNS OF A POTENTIAL RENAISSANCE

But, the big historical question remains, “Is a renaissance of humanistic psychology possible?” I shall couch my answer in the form of a guarded optimism, as the signs appear everywhere, and the actual arising of a new psychology as yet remains only a possibility. In my historical opinion, the primary arena appears to be in the burgeoning field of neuroscience from which numerous humanistic and philosophical implications are emerging from advances in the biology of consciousness.

Cognitive information processing models clearly acknowledge the activation of hidden but more intelligent programs than what are visually seen in the immediate field of awareness. Here we have one of the basic precepts long put forward by depth-psychologists undergirding their arguments for the reality of the unconscious (Hilgard, 1986). At the same time, the very concept of consciousness as centered in brain functions is being called into question, with the identification of a vast parasynaptic information network that is not directly mediated by the central and peripheral nervous system (Schmitt, 1985)—the further investigation of which may hold the key to the biochemistry of the emotions...
Thus, the traditional distinction between the mind and the body becomes somewhat artificial if consciousness is, in fact, diffused throughout both systems. Meanwhile, such formulations have brought philosophical discussions about the relation of the brain to the mind back into basic science with a vengeance. This suggests—as the humanistic psychologists have long claimed—that a more holistic model of science will be required to understand these processes beyond the epistemology of cognitive behaviorism (Harman & Clark, 1995).

In fact, discussions about a new epistemology of science have been broached even within the context of cognitive science itself. For instance, Velmans (1993) has carried this new definition of consciousness further by presenting a theory of perception that considers the subjective state of the perceiver as an integral part of defining the object, thus this theory potentially renders useless all previous work that did not take these factors into account. Such developments, in turn, have raised new philosophical issues that reflect directly on how science is conducted (Laughlin, 1995).

I will give but two more examples here that recently have been brought to my attention, as I have discussed this issue elsewhere at greater length (Taylor, 1994, 1995).

The first occurs in an interesting series of articles by Watt on the relationship between psychoanalytic concepts that define the structure and organization of personality and recent advances in neuropsychology related to the architecture of the brain (Watt, 1990, 1992, 1994). Watt discusses right hemispheric dominance for receptive and affective functions, using correlations between psychoanalytic concepts of ego structure with Mesulam’s hierarchical model of corticolimbic zones, linking complex mental activity to various types of emotional behavior. Watt covers possible cortical sites of self-object representation, psychogenic trauma, and intrapsychic conflict as possible sources of functional commissurotomy; he looks at the correlation of hysterical personality styles and obsessive-compulsive disorders with differential hemispheric activation, and so on.

From these observations, Watt concludes that the clinical language of depth psychology represents a shorthand map that characterizes the complex relationship between interacting corticolimbic systems. His work suggests that an important new role for psychoanalysts might be emerging that would involve the con-
continued interpretation of advances in neurobiology to the wider community of psychotherapists involved in the practice of depth psychology.

We can only speculate how close the next step will be, if after the biology of the self, we will be able to achieve a more well-developed understanding of the biochemistry of the transcendent. In other words, many of the cherished concepts of the humanistic psychologists may have analogies within the new biology of consciousness. The problem is that the neuroscientists are functionally incapable of interpreting the humanistic implications of their own work, and the humanistic scholars are not even aware that a major revolution along the lines of their own thinking is underway. This is principally because the revolution is occurring in the domain of laboratory sciences, which most humanistic psychologists have long ago abandoned.

Another example of humanistic implications arising within contemporary empirical work in psychology involves genetic studies that provide the foundation for what has been called the Seven Factor Theory of Personality. Of particular interest is that this research has been carried on in the Department of Psychiatry at the Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, the spiritual home of the DSM-IV (APA, 1994).

Briefly, Cloninger and his associates (Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993; Svrakic, Whitehead, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 1993) have constructed a psychobiological model of personality that accounts for dimensions of both character and temperament. Reviewing the popular five factor model, which identifies neuroticism, extroversion, toughmindedness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness as the basic factors needed to describe normal personality disorders, they conclude that the five factor model does not capture certain domains of personality that are confirmed by studies in natural language such as individual autonomy, traditional moral values, and other aspects of maturity and self-actualization described in humanistic and transpersonal psychology” (Cloninger et al., p. 976). Synthesizing information from twin and family studies, studies of longitudinal development, neuropharmacologic and neurobehavioral studies of learning in humans and other animals, psychometric studies of personality in individuals and twin pairs, as well as information about social and cognitive development, and descriptions of personality development...
in humanistic and transpersonal psychology, the Washington University team developed a 300-word questionnaire that produced seven stable factors of personality.

These include four dimensions of temperament, thought to be independently heritable, manifest early in life, and involve preconceptual biases in perceptual memory and habit formation. The four are novelty-seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence, and persistence. They also include three dimensions of character, thought to be mature in adulthood, that influence personal and social effectiveness by insight learning about self-concepts. These they identified as self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self-transcendence.

The category of self-transcendence was the most important for the present discussion, first because the team linked it both theoretically and historically to the work of Aldous Huxley, Abraham Maslow, Viktor Frankl, Carl Rogers, Alan Watts, D. T. Suzuki, Carl Jung, Roberto Assagioli, Albert Ellis, Daniel Goleman, and Ken Wilber. Second, it appears to be an enduring personality trait related to enhanced life satisfaction and personal effectiveness. However, they said that according to their results it appears to be lower in psychiatric patients than in normal patients, and it emerges only later in life when people become more thoughtful, self-reflective, and introverted—when they tend to pray or meditate more frequently than they engage in sexual activity.

The point is that most humanistic and transpersonal psychologists remain unaware that their ideas have crept into mainstream personality diagnosis. As well, they do not normally engage in this kind of empirical work themselves. Rather, they advocate the centrality of their work for psychology as a whole and tend to peripheralize the importance of what most other psychologists are concerned with. Meanwhile, their own venue has been preempted now by these genetic researchers in psychiatry who have put forward a more sophisticated and empirically based picture of the whole personality that includes everything the humanistic and transpersonal psychologists have been advocating plus more.3

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Given this sketch of the present scene, what then might be proposed to enlarge and refresh the humanistic perspective? The first
step might be to renew in people’s minds the definition of the field, and the place to begin is a clarification of terms. For instance, in my opinion, it should be made clear that the terms humanistic and humanist do not necessarily mean the same thing. As I see it, humanist outside the academic sphere refers to secular humanism as a social phenomenon, whereas humanistic refers to a particular episode in the history of American psychology. Although it is true that the Greeks are often referred to as humanist philosophers because their subject matter was person-centered and humanism was a theme of the Renaissance scholars, the modern meaning of the term humanist refers, in the public’s mind, to the American Humanist Association, started by Madelene Murray O’Hare and the atheists who became politically active and were responsible for spearheading the movement that removed prayer from the schools. At the height of the humanistic movement in psychology, for instance, led by Rogers, Maslow, and May, the American Humanist Association elected arch opponent B. F. Skinner as Humanist of the Year. Maslow himself was a member of both groups.

Thus, much confusion over the juxtaposition of these terms has followed. My solution is a pragmatic one, namely to focus on psychology, especially issues surrounding such concepts as personality, consciousness, and psychotherapy. Humanism may be defined in terms of a philosophy or a social program, but my point is to awaken psychologists to a new view of humanistic psychology using a psychological language specifically relevant to their professional concerns.

Also, humanistic psychology should not exclusively be identified with the human potential movement as it now presently occurs in the minds of most psychologists. By the human potential movement, I refer to the experiential therapies, such as Fritz Perls’s Gestalt training, sensitivity groups, sexual encounter techniques, and the somatic therapies such as Rolfing, Postural Integration, Feldenkrais, Alexander Technique, Reichian body work, Shiatsu, Jö Rei, Reiki, and others.

As opposed to this perception, historically, the humanistic movement in American academic psychology represents more a theory of motivation and personality, a style within clinical psychology, and an approach toward methods of psychotherapy that address not only problems of psychopathology and normal adjustment, but heightened or enhanced human functioning as well.
Also, humanistic psychology is not the same as transpersonal psychology (Sutich, 1976). The humanistic movement grew out of American academic psychology as a reaction to psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Historically, as I have indicated, it is most closely related to personality, abnormal, social, and clinical psychology—the so-called soft sciences—especially the older era of the personality-social theorists such as Allport, Murray, and Murphy, the holistic neurophysiologists such as Kurt Goldstein, and the fields such as organizational behavior, the psychology of religion, psychoanalysis—especially in the tradition of the neo-Freudians—and the existential and phenomenological psychologists.

On the other hand, transpersonal psychology, which emphasizes meditation and a psychology of altered states of consciousness, is an outgrowth of an American folk-psychology (Taylor, 1993). It is part of a uniquely American visionary psychology that stretches back to 19th-century spiritualism and the philosophy of New Thought, the era of the transcendentalists before them, as well as the earlier mystical and utopian communities that flourished at the founding of the American colonies. It is the most recent American representative of a visionary tradition with roots that extend back to the shadow culture of Western rational thought—from the Greek mystery schools, neo-Platonism, and the hermetic tradition, to the Kaballah, Sufism, and on to the 18th-century English and German mystics.

Technically speaking, transpersonal psychology has no historical relation to American academic psychology except through its association with its parent, humanistic psychology, and through various clinical psychologists who are interested in consciousness and transcendence but who historically can focus on the transpersonal orientation only after they have finished their schooling and have become credentialed and established their own psychotherapeutic practices.

Also, humanistic psychology is not the same as human science. Human science, a term that is frequently bandied about, is taken (rather erroneously, in my opinion) in its broadest sense to mean a general overall rubric from which one coherently hangs humanistic psychology, psychohistory, phenomenological psychology, transpersonal psychology, political psychology, critical thinking, feminist perspectives, and other “-isms” that focus on the study of the person. Historically—and more accurately—it actually refers
to a distinct lineage of European social critics, Marxist scholars, and politically motivated social psychologists who have embraced the writings of such different continental thinkers as Habermas, Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan. These theorists have propounded various forms of constructionism, deconstructionism, and contextualism that represent an altogether new phase of western social thought. But, this tradition did not grow out of American academic psychology nor did it play a role in the early days of humanistic psychology as such. Rather, it is a later development from another quarter that has found a venue within certain institutions of humanistic psychology, and these institutions, in turn, have become one of several ways in which human science ideology and critical thinking have penetrated the fringes of academic psychology, influencing more interpretive approaches in psychology than methods grounded in experimental laboratory research.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF A PERSON-CENTERED SCIENCE

Although I am not so wedded to defining psychology exclusively as a science—preferring instead to see it as a bridge between science, the arts, and the humanities—it is clear to me that from a historical standpoint, the humanistic movement is uniquely positioned to address the centrality of the person not only within psychology but throughout the sciences generally. Psychology as a discipline and a profession I take as a case study for the larger scientific enterprise of which it longingly strives to be a part. The phenomenology of the science-making process itself places the person at the center of all scientific activity.

For these reasons, I conceive of psychology as inherently person-centered—whatever its subject matter. Furthermore, the center of gravity of such a person-centered science, as I conceive it, would contain at its core a growth-oriented theory of personality; a model of consciousness that contained within it some reference to the iconography of the transcendent; techniques of psychotherapy that acknowledge the existential and phenomenological dimension of experience; an array of experimental methods from qualitative to quantitative; and a sophisticated metaphysics that is at
once, in the Jamesean tradition, pragmatic, pluralistic, and radically empirical (Taylor, 1994).

For such a psychology to evolve (or a psychology like it), humanistic psychologists would have to meet a number of conditions. They would have to

1. Recover the major themes of humanistic psychology generated by the founders.

If I may be so bold as to project my own vision of such an epistemology as it might be constructed especially for contemporary psychologists, I would begin by retrieving the history of still viable themes in humanistic psychology that were generated between 1941 and 1969. These might certainly include:

- A psychotherapeutically-oriented depth-psychology that is at once social, developmental, and person-centered (following the work of Charlotte Buhler, Gordon Allport, Erik Erikson, Henry A. Murray, Gardner Murphy), in other words, a psychology that pays attention to life-span development and the importance of personal biographies; 8
- A growth-oriented theory of personality, one that emphasizes health and self-actualization (after the theories of Abraham Maslow, Sidney Jourard, and Clark Moustakas); 9
- A method of psychotherapeutics that is person-centered (in the tradition of Carl Rogers) and phenomenologically based (as articulated by Rollo May and James Bugental); 10
- A psychology that adequately accounts for the creative processes, as in the work of Barron, Getzels, Jackson, and even psychoanalysts such as Kubie and Kris; and
- A psychology that deals with states of consciousness and acknowledges, in addition to the normal every day waking condition, the reality of psychopathic and transcendent states, and recognizes the legitimacy of anomalous events (as in the works of Stanley Krippner, Beverly Rubik, Robert Jahn and Brenda Dunne, Marlyn Schlitz, and Charles Tart). 11

2. Reintegrate humanistic psychology within personality theory.

As a second step, the prehistory of humanistic psychology should be clearly situated in the holistic traditions in American
psychology that flourished in the 1930s and 1940s. These include the personology of Henry A. Murray; the personality-social psychologies of Gordon Allport and Gardner Murphy; the depth psychologies of Rank, Adler, Jung, as well as those of Freud, Erikson, Frankl, and Reich; the neuropsychiatry of Kurt Goldstein, and I would go so far as to say the existential psychology of systematic theologians such as Paul Tillich, Martin Buber, and Maurice Friedman.

3. Rearticulate James’s radical empiricism or some other equally sophisticated metaphysics of how experimental science should be conducted.

The third step would be the reconstruction of William James’s metaphysics of radical empiricism in the original sense that James had intended it: as a critique of experimentalism in psychology (Taylor, 1996). James originally maintained in the preface to his Principles of Psychology (1890) that although every good science is always periodically renovated by a metaphysical critique of its shortcomings, every science needs to be free of metaphysics when it is first launched. Also, he maintained that in 1890 there simply was no metaphysical system at the time that was sophisticated enough to challenge the positivistic viewpoint. Thus, he maintained that he would adopt positivism by default.

By the time of his presidential address to the APA in 1893, however, he announced to the utter shock of his audience that he had abandoned the positivistic viewpoint altogether. He said that he did this because the basic postulate of positivism—that there are no conditions outside the immediate field of awareness that control what is observed—had been disproved by new scientific information coming in from France and England on the reality of subliminal states of consciousness and on the phenomena of multiple personality. Instead, he had come to suspect that states of consciousness are not static; but rather, that one’s state is liable to change, and whatever its present form, it always conditions the object of perception.

Ultimately, in his Will to Believe and Other Essays in Philosophy, James (1897) called his new position “radical empiricism,” a metaphysical principle that he later wrote more about just after the turn of the century (James, 1904a, 1904b; McDermott, 1976).
By empiricism, he meant not just sensory data but the domain of all experience, and by radical, he meant to refer to the primacy of experience over all analytic models. To be radically empirical thus meant that if human experience were always the starting point for all investigations, then nothing within the realm of experience could be excluded from the domain of scientific psychology. This was his justification after 1890 for helping to establish the fields of experimental psychopathology, psychical research, and the psychology of religion (Taylor, 1996).

James later added to this metaphysical position two other key concepts. One was the pragmatic method, that beliefs are always tested not by their source but by their consequences. The other was noetic pluralism, that although unity within each individual was always possible, each one of us was still radically different from every other due to the uniqueness of our experience.

Although James is perhaps best known for his philosophy of pragmatism—noetic pluralism is always seen as something of an afterthought—radical empiricism was actually the core of his metaphysics. But, because of the international attention the pragmatic movement in American philosophy received and the undue amount of attention James had to devote to it, his formulation of radical empiricism languished. Eventually, he died before he could work out all the details of the radically empirical point of view, especially in terms of its application to psychology.

Experimental psychologists in America completely ignored what statements James was able to make, believing that he had completely abandoned psychology after 1890 when he rejected the positivistic position he had originally taken in his Principles of Psychology (1890). Only the personality-social psychologists of the 1930s and 1940s took his advice to remain person-centered and to look more deeply into depth psychology (Taylor, 1992). His doctrine of radical empiricism was eventually taken seriously by existentialists and phenomenologists in the tradition of continental philosophy, where it incubated in various forms until the 1950s and 1960s when it made its way back into American thought through the humanistic movement in psychology, albeit in a somewhat disguised form (Taylor, 1991). One of the most cogent examples we have today of this Jamesean position is the work of Amedeo Giorgi (1970), although Giorgi clearly puts himself in the camp of the continental philosophers and a Husserelian. It remains for a
new generation of humanistic psychologists to define the existential-phenomenological position in the tradition of James, Rogers, Allport, and May.

CONCLUSION

Thus, it is my position that humanistic psychology could make significant new gains if it were to (a) consolidate its subject matter around those themes related to personality, consciousness, and psychotherapy that are still relevant for contemporary psychology; (b) reclaim its rightful place as historically linked to the older personality-social psychologies in the American functional tradition; and then (c) marry this outlook to James's metaphysics of radical empiricism or some other equally sophisticated foundation for redefining how experiments are to be conducted. It is conceivable that the result could be a psychology that is both relevant to the concerns of the humanities, while also being sophisticated enough to address the increasingly important philosophical and humanistic implications of the neuroscience revolution related to the biology of consciousness. It might also fulfill Bugental's requirement that any revival of humanistic psychology means that scientific attention is once again directed toward the primacy of the subjective (Bugental, 1967). At the same time, however, if we are to learn anything from the scientific study of consciousness from James to Velmans, it would offer the correction that we should focus a new science on the totality of experience, which necessarily embraces both the subject and the object.

On the intellectual merits of the idea, the late Rollo May called the author on the phone just a week before he died, and after reading a draft of this article, said "What you have proposed will take several years to accomplish. And your colleagues, you will find, will drag their feet. Nevertheless, insofar as I have any power or influence left, regarding the merits of the idea, I give you a whole-hearted and enthusiastic, Yes!" (personal communication, 1994.)

NOTES

1. CDPP defines itself as "a consortium of colleges and universities and national associations, whose programs emphasize diverse theoretical
and practical knowledge, including but not limited to significant alternative perspectives such as phenomenological, existential, humanistic, and transpersonal approaches to psychology. The consortium includes the following: the Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP), the California Institute of Integral Studies, the Center for Humanistic Studies, Department of Psychology at Duquesne University, the Focusing Institute, John F. Kennedy University, the National Association of Humanistic Education, National Psychology Advisory Association, National Psychology Internships, Saybrook Graduate School, Department of Psychology at Seattle University, Department of Psychology at Sonoma State University, the Union Institute, Universidad Autonoma de la Laguna, the Psychology Department at the University of Chicago, the Psychology Department at the University of Dallas, Walden University, and the Department of Psychology at West Georgia College.

2. The Archives were created by an act of the California legislature that was introduced by John Vasconcellos, and it continues to amass materials on programs in humanistic psychology, the work of Virginia Satir, and related activities. It remains a working collection.

3. Krippner (personal communication, 1994) believes that this fact alone could lead the new renaissance.

4. Moustakas (1985), a pioneer founder of humanistic psychology, has examined the merging of these descriptors. Brewster Smith would likely not agree with me here (Smith, 1982).

5. Robert Frager (personal communication) describes the three wings of transpersonal psychology as (a) the assumption that to have a transpersonal experience you have to be in an altered state of consciousness, as in the work of Stanislav Grof (1998); (b) transpersonal means raking leaves—the profound reality of simple things experienced in our present state, as in the work of Fadiman and Frager (1997); and (c) the didactic elaboration of spiritual states from different traditions and their reinterpretation to American popular audiences, as in the work of Ken Wilber (1998). According to Frager, Arthur Hastings takes a thematic approach—transpersonal encompasses three domains: those who are interested in personal health and growth, those who try to map states of consciousness, and those who are trying to develop new a spiritual psychology.

6. Michael Arons has sympathetically chastised me for this position.

I think I mostly disagree with your distinction between humanistic psychology and human science research. True, most of this latter has recently gone postmodern and Marxist. Also, most of the humanistic pioneers really did not understand this research, especially the philosophical roots in Europe, but tipped their hats to it nonetheless. I’d say its relationship to humanistic psychology is a mixed bag. Maslow and Jourard were clearly natural science types. Whereas May (and Farber) helped introduce phenomenology to Americans. Rogers got into the human sciences act much later. However, human science research fits the humanistic psychology
model better than the leaders realized, and it is clearly humanistic (not Marxist) in the hands of scholars like Ricouer ... Moustakas ... [and] ... Giorgi. (Arons, personal communication, 1994.)

7. Krippner (personal communication, 1994) points out that there are also many constructionists in this tradition.


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